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Franchise Regulation
By DON AUGUSTINE* AND RONALD R. lH-RUSOFF**
A LTHOUGH franchised dealers have sold automobiles, bicycles,
farm equipment and innumerable other items since the turn of the
century, franchising' has become an extremely successful marketing
device only during the past five years. In 1965, Business Week esti-

mated that franchise arrangements account for over $65 billion worth
of annual sales; 2 and the following year Time Magazine stated that
'3
"[f]ranchising [is] one of the fastest growing facets of U.S. business."

By 1969, Time was able to report that "[f]ranchising operators enjoy

a 90 billion dollar a year business, accounting for 10% of the total U.S.
output of business services and a remarkable 28% of retail sales." 4
The success of some franchisors has been phenomenal. Slightly
over 400 Minnie Pearl's franchises were sold during the first nine
months of operation. 5 Food Hosts increased its annual before-tax earn*

LL.B., 1956, Hastings College of the Law; Member, San Diego Bar.
B.A., 1957, University of California, Berkeley; LL.B., 1963, LL.M., 1965,
Georgetown University; Member, San Diego Bar.
(Ed. note: Mr. Augustine is Director, Secretary, and General Counsel of Fotomat
Corporation and his firm, Sullivan, Marinos, Augustine & Delafield, represents several
large subfranchisees).
1. Franchising is a misnomer. Classically, franchises, which have been granted
since the late middle ages, are publicly bestowed monopolies. Franchising, as we know
it today, is more akin to licensing. See Glicknan, Franchising, 15 BusuNEss ORGAMZATONS §§ 2.02-.03 (1969) for several definitions. For the purposes of this article,
franchising shall mean an arrangement between a trademark licensor (franchisor) and
a licensee (franchisee) for the operation of a retail business embracing a specific
service or product, usually one having a uniform format or design of operation. For
example, a franchise is the grant to a licensee of the right to operate (under the
licensor's name) a distinctive hamburger, fried chicken or roast beef stand, or a
muffler or transmission shop. The franchisor is usually paid a franchising fee, and in
addition receives a royalty based upon a percentage of the gross sales.
2. BusIEss WEEK, June 19, 1965, at 72.
3. TrmE, May 13, 1966, at 95.
4. Id., Apr. 18, 1969, at 88. See also 115 CoNG. REc. H3936 (daily ed. May 21,
1969) (remarks of Congressman Rogers).
5. Prospectus for Minnie Pearl's Chicken System, Inc., at 3 (May 1, 1968). For
an interesting history of the firm, subsequently renamed Performance Systems, Inc., see
Elliott, Home to Roost, Barron's, Sept. 22, 1969, at 5.
**
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ings from $314,296 in 1965 to $1,355,737 in 1969.6 Kentucky Fried
Chicken grew from one franchise outlet in 1952 to 1,969 outlets by
March 31, 1968. 7 During the same period, the cash register also
jingled for Colonel Sanders. In 1965 the Colonel had sales of
$16,563,615;" in 1968 they were $80,196,536. 9 The most startling
example of the franchise success story is probably the Fotomat Corporation. Fotomat was incorporated on January 19, 1967 with a total
capitalization of $10,000.10 Two years later, Fotomat "went public";
537,500 shares, representing a 9.9% interest, were purchased by the
public for $10,750,000.11 Stock worth $10,000 in 1967 was now
valued in excess of $100 million.
Lest it be assumed that only the franchisors are making money,
a recent study revealed that the small businessman who buys a franchise stands an increased chance of remaining in business compared to
the completely independent businessman. The chances of remaining
in business for one, five and ten years are illustrated by the following
12
table:
Percentage of
Percentage of
franchise owners
independent owners
remaining
remaining
Number of years
in business
in business
1
97
62
5
92
23
10
90
16
In other words, a franchise owner has a 97 percent chance of still
being in business after one year while an independent owner has only
a 62 percent chance.
In many instances, the franchisees have become so successful that
they have been able to "go public" or have reaped immense capital
6.

Prospectus for Food Hosts, U.S.A., Inc., at 5 (Sept. 4, 1969).

7.

Prospectus for Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. Exchange Offer, at 13 (May

5, 1969).

8. Id. at 8.
9.

10.
11.

Id. at 10.

Prospectus for Fotomat Corp., at 14 (Apr. 30, 1969).
Id. at 4. Elliott, Speculative Bellyache?, Barron's, Aug. 25, 1969, at 3, 18,

lists 133 fast food franchisors with publicly held stock.
12. 115 CONG. REc. H3937 (daily ed. May 21, 1969); cf. Levy, So You Want to
Run a Franchise?,DUN'S REVIEW, Jan., 1969. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE
TRUSTING (1969), attempts to create a sinister impression from this statistic by stating: "Even if the franchisor offers a successful package, a franchisee might fail because
of lack of ability or application, or by reason of an inherently poor or deteriorating
location. According to figures reported by Dun's Review, approximately 10% of all
franchisees fail." id. at 5.
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gains selling their franchises back to the franchisor.' 3
One of the most notable recent offerings by a franchisee was that of
West American Foods, owner of 123 Performance Systems Inc. franchises (formerly Minnie Pearl's Chicken System) which recently registered 25 percent of its common stock to be publicly offered for $2.8
million.' 4 Another is Gino's, a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchisee

that has outstanding 4,697,614 shares of common stock recently selling at $46 a share.' 5
Unfortunately, a number of franchisors have been involved in activities which have brought adverse publicity to the industry. 16 Der

Wienerschnitzel came out with a public stock offering in June 1969;
but after the stock had traded over-the-counter for 10 days, the underwriter, in an unusual move, withdrew it from trading.' 7 The Attorneys General of California' 8 and New York 9 have lodged criminal

complaints against certain franchise promoters; the SEC has brought
suit against at least one franchisor; 20 and franchisees have brought
13. In 1968, Kentucky Fried Chicken reacquired 122 outlets for $3,673,500 and
230,125 shares of common stock; in 1969, it acquired eight outlets for $825,000 and is
in the process of acquiring an additional 32 units for an aggregate price of $3,260,000
cash and 32,929 shares of the company's common stock-approximately $103,000 per
unit. Since each of these outlets were originally sold for $40,000, this represents a
profit of over $63,000 per outlet. Prospectus for Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. Exchange Offer, at 17 (May 5, 1969). The Fotomat Corporation has the right to repurchase many of its franchises for the greater of $50,000 or 5 to 6% times annual
net profits. Since each franchise was sold for $21,000, this represented a minimum
profit of $29,000. Prospectus for Fotomat Corp. at 12 (Apr. 30, 1969).
14. Preliminary Prospectus for West America Foods, Inc., at 5 (July 25, 1969).
15.

STANDARD & POOR'S, OVER THE COUNTER REGIONAL EXCHANGE STOCK RE-

PORTS 3993P (Nov. 12, 1969). Other franchises in the process of becoming publicly
held are: Collins Foods Int'l, Inc., Prospectus, at 3 (Sept. 6, 1968) (33 Kentucky
Fried Chicken franchises in southern California); Confare Restaurants Inc., Preliminary Prospectus, at 3 (July 29, 1969) (65 Burger King franchises); Davis Food Serv.,
Inc., Preliminary Prospectus, at 3 (Dec. 28, 1967) (42 Kentucky Fried Chicken franchises in Georgia); Management Systems, Inc., Preliminary Prospectus, at 7 (Sept. 16,
1969) (18 International House of Pancakes in Florida); Leisure Foods of America,
Preliminary Prospectus, at 3 (July 3, 1969) (Lum's franchises).
16. Frequently, critics of franchising overlook the fact that in a $90 billion industry, an extremely small percentage of "bad eggs" results in a great many ilustrations of reprehensive behavior.
17. CAL. Bus. NEWS, Nov., 1969.
18. People v. Jet-A-Way Indus., Inc., Crim. No. 146, 381 (San Mateo County,
Cal., Super. Ct., filed July 1969), in CONTINENTAL FRANCmUS Rv., Aug. 11, 1969,
at 5.
19. State v. Buffalo Franchise Corp. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed May 29, 1969); State
v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Feb. 7, 1969).
20. SEC v. John Rich Enterprises, No. C-69-452-RFP, (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 25,
1969).
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major suits against Chock Full 0' Nuts,2 1 AAMCO Transmission,22
Shakey's Pizza,23 Credit Clearing Corp. of America,2 4 Chicken Delight, 25 Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 26 and Midas Mufflers. 27

Certain fran-

chise promoters have been sharply criticized both by government officials2 8 and by individuals connected with the industry.2 9 Although at
21.
Ct., filed
22.
Inc., 305
23.

21 July Corp. v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., Civil No. 8006-69 (N.Y. Sup.
June 1969), in CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REV., Oct. 6, 1969, at 6.
International Business Coordinators, Inc. v. Aamco Automatic Transmissions,
F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Klinzing v. Shakey's, Inc., No. 69-C-344 (E.D. Wis., filed July 14, 1969), in
CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REV., July 28, 1969, at 2.
24. Waddleton v. Credit Clearing Corp., Civ. A. No. 69-986-J (D. Mass., filed
Sept. 1969), in CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REV., Oct. 20, 1969, at 8.
25. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
26. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
27. Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968);
see Davis v. Missouri B & B Permanent & Temporary Placement Systems, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 17264-1 (W.D. Mo., filed June 1969), in CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REv., July 14,
1969, at 5; Lower v. Der Wienerschnitzel Int'l, Inc., Civil No. 303,104 (San Diego
County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed Feb. 27, 1968).
28. Senator Hart stated that the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee
held hearings at which time the Committee was presented with "examples of franchisors who required price fixing, exclusive dealing, territorial allocations, full forcing,
requirement contracts and other practices which are treated extensively in most antitrust textbooks.
"Perhaps even more important, we heard repeated examples of franchisors reserving the best customers for themselves; competing unfairly with their own franchisees
by selling to potential or current franchisee customers at prices below those available
to the franchisee himself. Further, we heard about franchisors who let the franchisee
build up a good territory and good customers, then moved in and took the territory of
[sic] customers away." 115 CONG. REc. S4136 (daily ed. April 25, 1969).
FTC Commissioner James M. Nicholson stated: "Whether such claims are made
in newspaper advertising or by salesmen in oral presentations, franchisors are expected to avoid out-and-out misrepresentations, deceptive nondisclosure, or insidious
borderline deceits. To begin with, franchise promoters who concoct a new road-side
food gimmick one day, should not advertise it the following day as a well known
trademark which has become a household name. Next, the size of the investment required of the franchisee should be completely and accurately spelled out. The
prospective earnings of the franchisees must not be exaggerated. Franchisors must resist the temptation to recruit on the basis that the plan has been so successful that
franchisees work only a few months, and lounge in Florida for the remainder of the
year.
"Franchisors must also avoid making any deceptive representation about the value
or scope of their own undertaking. Misrepresentation respecting the training program
provided by franchisors should be avoided. If the franchisor gives little supervision
and assistance in the management and operation of the franchise, contrary representations should not be made. Often franchisors represent that in exchange for the receipt
of royalties, expensive advertising and promotional campaigns will be conducted. This
is a serious deceit if not true." Address by James M. Nicholson, FTC Commissioner,
before the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 26,
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this writing the franchise industry has not been singled out for special
control, a wide variety of proposals are pending both in Congress and
in several of the state legislatures. 30 The balance of this article discusses present and potential franchise regulation.
I. Present Regulation
Franchisors who induce persons to purchase franchises by means
of fraudulent representations will be subject to civil and criminal prosecution3 1 and recission in each of the several states. In addition, if the
franchise promoter has used an instrument of interstate commerce to
implement his sale, 32 he will be subject to prosecution for mail fraud,33
to action by the Federal Trade Commission for unlawful "deceptive
acts or practices in commerce" under section 5 of the FTC Act,3 4 and
possibly to action by the SEC for violation of Rule 1Ob-5. 5
Franchisors have been subject to considerable litigation for violation of various antitrust provisions.3 6 It is clear that a franchisor cannot
dictate the resale price. to be charged by the franchisee, either directly
1969, in 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 50,238, at 55,479 (May 6, 1969). See also Jones, The
Growth and Importance of Franchisingand the Role of Law, 12 ABA ANTrrRuST BULL.
717 (1967); Address by Everette MacIntyre, FTC Commissioner, before the International Franchise Ass'n, Washington, D.C., May 8, 1969, in 5 TRADE REG. REP.
ff 50,240 (May 12, 1969); Address by Rufus Wilson, FTC Division of General Trade
Restraints Chief, in H. BROWN, FRANcHIsiNG: TRAP FOR THE TRusTING 141 (1969).
29. H. BROWN, FRANCHmIING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING (1969); Burck, Franchising's Troubled Dream World, FORTUNE, Mar., 1970, at 116; Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agreement as a Security Under Securities
Acts, Including IOb-5 Considerations,'24Bus. LAW. 1311, 1321 (1969); Pierno, Franchise Regulations, The Need for a New Approach, 44 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 501
(1969); Editorial by Thomas H. Murphy in CONEINETAL FRANCHISE REv., Nov. 3,
1969, at 8.
30. See text accompanying notes 175-97 infra.
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689; CAL. PEN. CODE § 484; see People v. Jet-A-Way
Indus., Inc., Crim. No. 146,381 (San Mateo County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed July 1969),
in CoNTINENTAL FRANCHIsE REV., Aug. 11, 1969, at 5.
32. Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Belhumeur
v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78, 85-86 (D. Mont. 1964); see Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320
(1967).
33. 18 U.S.C. H9 1341, 1343 (1964).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969); see Goodwin, Franchising in The Economy: The FranchiseAgreement As a Security Under Securities Acts, Including lob-5
Considerations,24 Bus. LAW. 1311, 1321-24 (1969).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964); Meal or Snack System, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,671 (FTC July 25, 1969); Thermochemical Prods. Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,862 (FTC Apr. 1, 1969).
36. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964); cf. United States v. O.M. Scott & Sons., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
172,884 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 1969).
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or indirectly, 37 for an attempt to establish either a minimum price
or a maximum price3 8 results in a per se violation of the Sherman
39
Act.
Absent a conspiracy, a franchisor cannot be compelled to grant
franchises to more than one franchisee in any given territory 40 nor be
compelled to allow a franchisee to have more than one outlet in an
area. 41 However, when franchisees have agreed among themselves not
to compete in each other's territories, or where they are prohibited by
the franchise agreement from selling out of their exclusive territory, a
42
violation has occurred.
Exclusive dealing requirements are illegal,43 as are agreements
whereby the franchisee promises to primarily handle the franchisor's
product, in return for certain benefits withheld from noncontracting
dealers.4 4 The Federal Trade Commission contends that an antitrust
violation has occurred when a course of conduct between buyer and
seller results in third parties being foreclosed from selling to the buyer. 45
Nevertheless, this area is still in a state of flux, for requirements contracts have been permitted when the buyer needed assurance of a constant source of supply.46
Franchisors frequently require their franchisees to purchase supplies from them. There is no question that the franchisor is prohibited
37.

See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

38.

Cf. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968); Sahn v. V-1 Oil Co.,

402 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1968).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); see United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960).
40. Ace Beer Distrib., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963); Miller
Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958); Packard Motorcar
Co. v. Webster Motorcar Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822
(1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 399 (D. Md.),
a! 'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956).
41. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1968)
(final consent decree after remand from Supreme Court); cf. White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). See also Glickman, Franchising, 15 BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS §§ 4-7 (1969).
42. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384
U.S. 127 (1966).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 14, 45 (1964); see International Business Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
44. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
18,485 (FTC 1968); cf. Advance
45. L. G. Balfour Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1968), affd,
415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969). But see PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUC50,250, at 55,517-18 (1969).
TIVITY AND COMPETITION, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
46. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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from requiring the franchisee to purchase such standard items as

chicken, hamburger or bread from him or from a designated supplier.
Nor may he designate the supplier of standard restaurant equipment.
To do so is a violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act. 47 However,
franchisors may limit their franchisees to a prescribed menu to insure
uniformity among their outlets. To accomplish this, the courts will

allow a franchisor whose products are made from a secret formula to
restrict the franchisee's purchases of machinery48 and supplies to those
which will make the product to the franchisor's specifications. 9
Certain franchisors have been extremely cavalier in violating vari-

ous antitrust provisions, especially those concerning "tying agreements."
The rationale for this disregard was that few individual franchisees
could afford to maintain an antitrust suit; in any event, damages, even

trebled, would never outweigh potential profits to be realized from the
unlawful act.

The case of Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,"0 however,

has forced a reassessment of this theory.
In Siegel, five Chicken Delight franchisees brought a class action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of themselves and
the 650 other franchisees similarly situated. The court has allowed the
five plaintiffs to inform all other franchisees of the suit and to join all as

plaintiffs, except those franchisees evidencing a desire not to join. At
this writing, it would be understating the situation to say the franchisor,
Chicken Delight, is in serious trouble.

H. A Franchise as a Security
In early 1967, the California Commissioner of Corporations requested an opinion from the Attorney General whether a franchise ar47. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964); cf. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968);
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371
U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); International Business Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great W. Financial
Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305, 325, 444 P.2d 481, 493-94, 70 Cal. Rptr. 849, 861-62 (1968).
See also Dillon, Exclusive Dealing, Requirement Contracts, Tieing Arrangements and
Full Line Forcing,37 ABA ANTrrRusT L.J. 146 (1968).
48. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as
improv. granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
49. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, 332 F.2d 502
(2d Cir. 1964); Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 887 (1962); Chicken Delight E., Inc. v. Hunter Paper Co., 1968
Trade Cas. 72,448 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); Chicken Delight E., Inc. v. A. Weitzmann's
Sons, 1968 Trade Cas. 72,425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
50. 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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rangement constitutes a security within the meaning of the California
Corporate Securities Law, "[w]here the franchisee participates only
nominally in the franchised business in exchange for a share of the
profits," or "[w]here the franchisee participates actively in the franchised business and where the franchisor agrees to provide certain goods
and services to the franchisee." 5 1
As the states are not preempted from regulating offers of securities
made within their borders, they may impose standards entirely different
from those applied by the Securities and Exchange Commission.5 2 In
the event any given franchise agreement is deemed by the Commissioner
of Corporations to be a security, the francisor will be required to secure
a permit before an offer or sale of a franchise can be made. 53 This
means that the Commissioner of Corporations could require such terms
in the franchise agreement as would make it in his opinion fair, just and
equitable; further, the Commissioner might escrow the proceeds received from the sale of the franchises until each operation is delivered
to the franchisee.54
The Corporations Code defines the term "security" to include,
among other things, a "certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement . . . [and an] investment contract . . . 55
In this respect it is similar to section 2(1) of the Federal Securities
Act of 193356 and the definition adopted by many of the states. 57 It
is quite possible that a franchise agreement will fall within the ambit
of the above definition and therefore, if a franchise agreement may be
considered a security under the California code, the same agreement
would probably be deemed a security in other jurisdictions.
A. Investment Contract Defined
The term "investment contract" was defined by the Supreme Court
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.5 In that case, the W.J. Howey Co. owned
51. 49 Ops. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 124, 124-25 (1967).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1964).
53. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110.
54. Id. §§ 25140-41.
55. Id. § 25019.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964).
57. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.2-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); PA.
STAT. tit. 70, § 32(a) (Purdon 1965).
New York defines "security" in a somewhat
different manner. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
58. 328 U.S. 293 (1947); see SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202
(1967); SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). See also 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 483 (2d ed. 1961).
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a large tract of citrus acreage in Florida. To finance additional development, the company offered a portion of its holdings to the public.
Most sales were of small plots averaging 1.33 acres. The tracts were
not separately fenced; the principal indication of separate ownership
was found in the plot book. Since most of the purchasers were nonresident business and professional people lacking the knowledge, skill
and equipment necessary for the care and cultivation of citrus trees, a
service contract was offered in connection with each sale.
Eighty-five percent of the purchasers elected to take advantage of
the service contract. In each instance, they contracted with a second
corporation entitled Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. for the care and
marketing of their fruit. Both corporations, W.J. Howey Co., and
Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. were under common control and management.
In reaching the conclusion that the Court was dealing with the sale
of a security (for purposes of section 2(1) of the Securities Act), 59
Mr. Justice Murphy reasoned that when Congress used the term "investment contract" to define "security," it adopted the meaning given
this term by a number of state courts.A0 Mr. Justice Murphy defined
an investment contract, for purposes of the Securities Act, to mean:
[A] contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed
in the enterprise. 61
He then stated that "[tjhe test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely
from the efforts of others."62
Once the term investment contract was defined, the application
to the factual situation before the Court was fairly simple. There was
no question that the purchaser and the seller were involved in a common
enterprise and that the buyer expected to realize a profit solely from
the efforts of the service company controlled by the seller.
The principle that a buyer has purchased a security any time he
invests money in an enterprise with the seller, when his profits will
come solely from the efforts of others, has been applied in a series of
cases, each involving a slightly different factual situation.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964).
60. 328 U.S. at 298.
61. Id. at 298-99.
62. Id. at 301.
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Blackwell v. Bensten6 z was an extension of Howey. In that
case, the Pummill Development Company owned an 800 acre tract
of land suitable for citrus cultivation which, though undeveloped,
was sold, in most instances, in 20 acre plots. A related entity, the
Pummill Management Company, would enter into a contract with
the purchaser to develop the property. The Fifth Circuit rejected
the argument that the case could be distinguished from Howey because
it involved the sale of unimproved real estate rather than an existing
citrus grove. It held that the purchaser intended to profit from the development of the land by an agency related to the seller; therefore, the
sales were investment contracts.
In Sire Plan Portfolios v. Carpentier,64 an Illinois court was presented with a set of facts similar to those found in Howey. Defendant
sold interests to Illinois residents in a New York cooperative apartment
managed by a seller-controlled service company. The court rejected
the defendant's contention that it was selling an undivided interest in
real estate and determined that defendant sold an investment contract
which came within the scope of the definition of a security under the
Illinois "blue sky" law.
Courts have reached the same conclusion when dealing with the
sale of other contracts similar in nature to franchises. The sale of un68
7
improved land, 65 trust deeds, 66 condominiums, rental agency plans,
country club memberships,6 9 oil leases, 70 and distributorships, 7 1 which
in many ways are similar to franchises, have all been held to be securities.
B. The Participation Test
By applying the well-settled Howey rule to franchise agreements,
63. 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954).
64. 8 Ill.
App. 2d 354, 132 N.E.2d 78 (1956).
65. Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347
U.S. 925 (1954); SEC v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962).
66. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).

67.

See Rohan, The Securities Law Implication of Condominium Marketing

Programs Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 CONN. L. REv. 1, 5 n.9,
8 n.16 (1969).

68. See Berger, Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion and the Need for
Protection, 69 YALE L.J. 725 (1960).
69.

Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.

Rptr. 186 (1961). See also Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 1140, 1142-43 (1963).
70. Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824
(1961).
71. United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
999 (1966).
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the California Attorney General was able to rule that when a purchaser
participates only nominally in the conduct of the franchised business,
the franchise would constitute a security. 7 Conversely, if the purchaser expects to participate actively in the sale of goods or services,
73
the franchise would not be a security.
The reason advanced for excluding from the scope of the securities law those franchises in which the franchisee is an active participant is that the franchisee has a right of control over the project, full
knowledge of current transactions, and access to financial information."
Because of this, it has been urged that the protection of full disclosure
offered by registration is not needed and should not be required. 75
The Attorney General further ruled that the franchisor who offers
the franchisee a plan where he need only participate nominally cannot
avoid regulation by also offering the franchisee an opportunity of participating in management of the franchised business. His theory is that
the franchisee has been offered the opportunity to participate in an investment contract, and the offer as well as the sale of a security may
be regulated."
This theory is well supported by authority from the federal courts.
The management contract before the Fifth Circuit in Blackwell v.
72. 49 Ops. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 124, 126 (1967).
73. Id. at 127; Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., [1961-64 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 191,293 (D.D.C. 1963). See also Chapman v. Rudd
Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969).
74. See Polikoff v. Levy, 55 IlM. App. 2d 229, 234, 204 N.E.2d 807, 809 (1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1966); cf. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26
(1953).

75. See Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchising Under the Securities Act of 1933
and the California Corporation Code, 44 Los ANGELES B. BU-LL. 555, 557 (1969);
Coleman, A FranchiseAgreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities Law of 1933,
22 Bus. LAw. 493 (1967); Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise
Agreement as a Security Under Securities Acts, Including 10b-5 Considerations, 24
Bus. LAW. 1311, 1321 (1969).
76. 49 Ops. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 124, 126 (1967). The following advertisement
taken from section 1, page 2 of the August 24, 1969 edition of the Los Angeles Times,
is illustrative of the type of offering covered by the opinion:
PRIME RIB INN
We offer 3 Programs
1-Own a chain of our restaurants through our management program. We will
provide and train the men to head your operation who will invest $10,000 in one
unit.
2-Own and operate yourself. Partial financing for qualified individuals.
3-Individual capable of managing sophisticated restaurant operations with investment of $10,000 on a secured basis.
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Bentsen7" contained a provision whereby the purchaser could give directions concerning the marketing of his crop; 78 the court, nevertheless,
held the sale to be one of a security. It will be recalled in Howey that
the purchaser could elect to manage the property himself, and, in fact,
15 percent of the purchasers did this. Mr. Justice Murphy swept this
problem aside, stating:
This conclusion is unaffected by the fact that some purchasers
choose not to accept the full offer of an investment contract by
declining to enter into a service contract with the respondents.
The Securites Act prohibits the offer as well as the sale of unregistered, non-exempt securities. Hence, it is enough that the respondents79 merely offer the essential ingredients of an investment
contract.
Undoubtedly, if the franchisee is offered a plan whereby he can
avoid any participation, or only nominal participation in the conduct
of the business is required, he has been offered an investment contract.
The more difficult problem, ignored by the Attorney General and the
Commissioner of Corporations, is determining when nominal participation becomes active participation.8"
C.

Amount of Franchisor Participation Allowed

Although the case law is scanty, there is at least one recent decision
that indicates that active participation need not be exclusive participation, thereby allowing both the franchisor and franchisee to exercise
elements of control. 8 ' In addition, there is a case from the District of
Columbia8 2 dealing squarely with the problem of franchisor participation, and a series of cases where the National Labor Relations Board83
attempted to prescribe what activities could be carried on by the
franchisor, while still leaving the franchisee in control of the business.
In Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp.,84 the franchisor
was obligated to furnish data concerning procedures, accounting, ad77. 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954).
78. Id. at 691.
79. 328 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1946) (footnotes omitted).
80. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.105.4 (1969), defining franchises as securities, uses the term "nominally" without attempting to define it.
81. Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 425, 41 Cal. Rptr.
869, 871-72 (1964).
82. Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., [1961-64 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,293 (D.D.C. 1963).
83.

E.g., Southland Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 67 L.R.R.M. 1582 (1968);

Mister Softee, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 354, 64 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1966).
84. Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., [1961-64 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

91,293, at 94,297 (D.D.C. 1963).
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vertising and other "know-how." Selection of the physical location of
the store (within the 50-mile radius), selection of employees, training
of employees, supervision of employees and hours of store operation
were exclusively in the hands of the franchisee.8 5 Given this set of facts,
the court was unable to find that the franchisee was led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, as required by
Howey. Therefore, the franchise was not a security.8 6
The Drug Management test clearly allows the franchisor to designate the merchandise to be sold, so long as the franchisee has a voice
in its ultimate selection, the accounting system, and the advertising. Although the question was not before the court, obviously there would be
no objection to the franchisor of an easily identifiable business-e.g.,
"Howard Johnson's"-designating the design and color scheme that
the business structure must follow. Finally, it seems unlikely that the
franchisee would be relegated to the status of a "nominal participant"
if the franchisor selected, or helped select, the site location.
Southland Corp.8 8 is illustrative of the NLRB's approach to
the question whether the franchisee is in control of his operation. In
that case, Wallace S. George operated a Speedee Mart Store as a franchisee of Southland Corporation. The franchise agreement provided
that the franchisee would turn over all cash proceeds to Southland
daily, and the latter, out of these proceeds, would pay all purchase
invoices, salaries and other expenses, and would handle all bookkeeping.
The agreement also provided that Southland would suggest retail prices
and would suggest approved sources of supplies.
The NLRB held that the arrangement for central accounting did
not give Southland control over the enterprise. It then found, as a
factual matter, that there was no control over retail prices because the
franchisee could and did disregard suggested prices.8 9 Furthermore,
Southland's suggestion of various suppliers of foods did not amount to
control because the franchisee could use substituted products. Finally,
the Board found that the franchisee had exclusive control over the selection of his employees. 90
85. Id. at 94,298.
86. id. at 94,297-98.
87. In Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869
(1964), the promoter sold an identifiable parcel of land; the fact of his selection of the
site, however, was not deemed controlling.
88. 170 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 67 L.R.R.M. 1582 (1968).
89. Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1583.
90. Id.
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Although Southland Corp. involved the question whether the
franchisor had sufficient control to bring it under the Board's jurisdiction, the opinion considered some of the same factors discussed in
Drug Management. It is of special significance that the Board found
the franchisor's use of suggested suppliers and suggested retail prices
did not deprive the franchisee of active control of the business. 9 ' Similar tests have been applied to determine whether a franchisee is independent for purposes of wage hour control, 9 2 unemployment insurance," jurisdiction,9 4 and agency-principal relations.9 5
Stated in its most simple terms, if the promoter, directly or indirectly
through a controlled management company, offers to conduct the dayto-day operations, or employs the franchisee as manager, 9 6 the franchisee has been offered a security. On the other hand, if the promoter
does not make such an offer, the mere employment of an independent
manager by the franchisee should not destroy his status of active participant. Under the settled rules of agency, the acts of the agent are deemed
the acts of the principal-in this case, the franchisee. This situation is
analogous to the individual who purchases an apartment building and
subsequently employs a manager to oversee the operation. There is no
question that the manager is the owner's agent, that the manager's acts
are the acts of the owner, and that the owner's participation is more
than nominal.
A good many franchise agreements provide for a "turnkey operation." These are the situations where the franchisor selects the site,
has the building constructed to his specifications, provides the initial
stock of merchandise-perhaps in part with funds advanced by the
franchisee-and employs and trains the initial operating personnel.
Within a short period, control over the day-to-day operations is given to
the franchisee. It could be argued that the franchisee is relying on the
efforts of the franchisor for the return on his investment; yet, once the
91. Id.
92. 29 C.F.R. §§ 779.230-.232 (1969).
93. See Glickman, Franchising,15 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 2.03 (1969).
94. Volkswagen Interamericana v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 441 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 919 (1966); Fiat Motor Co. v. Alabama Imported Cars, Inc., 292
F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 898 (1961); Florio v. Powder
Power Tool Corp., 248 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957).
95. Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Nugey v. Paul Lewis Laboratories, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Howard
v. White, 144 Colo., 391, 356 P.2d 485 (1960); Westre v. DeBuhr, 82 S.D. 276, 144
N.W.2d 734 (1966); Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60 (1967).
96. Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 64 (N.D. Ohio 1964); People v.
Jaques, 137 Cal. App. 2d 823, 835-36, 291 P.2d 124, 131 (1955).
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franchisee takes control, he is an active, not a nominal, 9participant.
7
Therefore, it is clear that no security has been offered for sale.
D.

Franchisee's Contribution of Capital

The typical franchise requires the franchisee to make a large cash
payment when he receives the franchise. By way of illustration, it has
been reported that a Minnie Pearl's Fried Chicken franchisee is required
to have minimum cash of $26,000, of which $14,250 is paid to the
franchisor when the franchise agreement is signed.9"
Should the fact that franchisees as a group make a sizeable contribution to the franchisor's capital turn a franchise into a security?
Evidently the Commissioner of Corporations thought so for he also
requested the Attorney General's opinion whether a franchise agreement constitutes a security "where the franchisee participates actively
in the franchised business . . . but where the franchisor intends to
secure a substantial portion of the initial capital that is needed to provide such goods and services from the fees paid by the franchisee or
franchisees." 99
The Attorney General first acknowledged that it is clear "the
franchisee's expectation of profit through the sales made by the franchised business is not enough to constitute this agreement a security."' 0 0
He then went on to rule that "[ilf a franchisor solicits fees from his
franchisees in order to raise a substantial portion of his initial capitali,,101 Adzation [i.e., the 'risk capital'] . . . a security arises . .
vancing this conclusion was easy; supporting it, considerably harder.
There is no case law that offers a shred of support for this theory;
10 2
indeed, there are several decisions which imply that it is wrong.
97. Congress adopted this approach in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-172, § 516(c) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1253). It provides that the transfer of
a franchise is not taxable as the sale of a capital asset if the transferor retains any
significant power, right, or continuing interest over the franchise. Significant retained rights include a right to disapprove any assignment, to terminate at will, to
prescribe standards of quality, to sell or advertise only products or services of the franchisor, to require the franchisee to purchase substantially all supplies and equipment
from the franchisor and to receive payments contingent on the productivity, use or
disposition of the subject matter of the franchise if such payments constitute a
"substantial element" under the franchise agreement.
98. CoNTjNENTAL FANCmSE REV., Aug. 12, 1968, at 2.
99. 49 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 124, 125 (1967).
100. Id. at 127.
101. Id. at 128.
102. In Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp., [1961-64 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1191,293 (D.D.C. 1963), the franchisee gave the franchisor
$10,000 at the outset of the venture. In People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601
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And, to make matters worse, the Attorney General had twice before
determined that franchise agreements wherein the franchisee was to
provide a portion of the initial capital were not securities." 3
1.

Risk-Capital Test

The Attorney General pointed out that the California Supreme
Court, in the case of Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, °4 had said
that the promotors of the country club were "soliciting the risk capital
with which to develop a business for profit."' 0 5 On this basis, he then
reasoned that the solicitation of "risk capital" was an additional test
for finding a security. But the supreme court's decision in Silver Hills
is not applicable to the sale of franchises, because the purchasers did
not actively participate in the operation of the business. If they were
to receive any return on their investment (enjoyment of country club
facilities), it would be through the efforts of the promotors. Therefore, once it was determined that the return on the investment need not
be pecuniary in nature, the sale of club memberships qualified as the
sale of a security under the test of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.'0 6 Moreover, in Howey, the Supreme Court had explicately stated:
We reject the suggestion that an investment contract is necessarily
missing where the enterprise is not speculative or promotional in
character and where the tangible interest which is sold has intrinsic
value independent of the success of the enterprise as a whole. The
test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others. If that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative or nonspeculative or whether there is a sale
of property with or without intrinsic value. The statutory policy
. . . is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrevelant formulae. 1 7
2.

Two-Business Test

In the event this "risk capital" argument were unacceptable, an
alternate theory was advanced. If correctly understood, the argument
is: If the capital provided by the franchisee to the promoter enables
(1951), students paid for rehearsals, but these proceeds may or may not have been
used to finance the production of a movie. In Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Il1. App. 2d 229,
204 N.E.2d 807 (1965), the promoter was paid $57,500, which was part of the capital
needed to construct a motel. In each instance it was held that no security existed.
103. 12 OPs. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 23 (1948); id. at 24, citing Ops. CAL. AT'Y
GEN. 9525 (Aug. 7, 1934).
104. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
105. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
106. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
107. 328 U.S. at 301 (citations omitted).
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the promoter to supply the franchisee with certain goods and services,
[the] franchised business operated by the franchisee and the franchisor's business of supplying the franchisee with goods and services are separate "business ventures" and that the venture in which
the franchisee participates is not the same venture for which he
supplies the risk capital . . . [in spite of] [t]he fact that these
two "business ventures" are contained in the same franchise agree108
ment ....
The suggestion that the franchisor, at the time the franchise agreement is signed, is operating two business-selling franchises, and selling
goods and services to be used in the franchise-is at best arguable. In
all franchises-except those where the franchisor only licenses the use of
his name-equipment, facilities, and technical know-how are part of
the franchise. It is these features that give the franchise value. Although, admittedly, the franchisor may subsequently sell supplies to the
franchisee and this might be considered a separate business, the price
of these supplies is not included in the initial franchise fee and the sale
of supplies takes place on a recurring basis. Moreover, the Attorney
General overlooks the fact that the "two business" argument was advanced and rejected in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 0 9 Los Angeles Trust
Deed & Mortgage Exchange v. SEC,"0 and Blackwell v. Bentsen."'
Within two months after the opinion was issued, the Commissioner
of Corporations released a bulletin providing in part that when a substantial portion of the initial risk capital of the franchisor is to be contributed by the franchisee, the franchise will not be deemed a security
in those situations where:
1. The franchisor, without resort to funds to be contributed by
the franchisee, has sufficient capital to operate the franchising
program, to provide the facilities, paraphernalia, and services
promised to the franchisees, and to continue these activities
for an indefinite period of time.
2. The franchisor's business has a history of successful operation
for a sufficient length of time to adequately demonstrate the
public demand for the franchised product or service.
3. The franchisor has adequate organization, facilities, management, and other experienced personnel available or on call,
justifying the conclusion that he will be able to successfully
administer the franchising program and to confer upon the
108. 49 OPs. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 124, 129 (1967). Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F.
Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improv. granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965), an antitrust case having nothing to do with the
problem except that it involved franchises, is cited as support for this theory.
109. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
110. 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
111. 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954).
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franchisee the benefits offered by the program. 112
3.

Large FranchisorsExempt From Regulation

When the rules accompanying the recent amendments to the California Corporations Code appeared, they abandoned the above test and
merely provided that a franchisor receiving a substantial portion of its
risk capital from the sale of a franchise to an active franchisee is exempt
from regulation if it "has a net worth of not less than $500,000 immediately prior to such sale."' 18
The question whether a franchisor with a net worth of less than
$500,000 is being unfairly discriminated against and thereby denied
equal protection of the laws is of interest to those franchisors operating
in California, or contemplating entering California. The underlying
issue-whether a regulatory agency has the authority to require a promoter, who receives a substantial portion of his initial capital from an
actively participating franchisee, to comply with the registration requirements-is of interest to us all. Although the question is untested, SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co." 4 suggests that the regulatory bodies are without
authority to impose such regulations.
Although the Wisconsin Securities Commissioner classified franchises as securities in January 1970," and there have been a few actions instigated by both public prosecutors'" and private litigants in
other states,"' if the advertisements appearing daily in the Los Angeles
Times are any indication, regulation of franchise offerings as securities
has been ineffectual. The Commissioner seems to have abandoned any
attempt to regulate franchise offerings and is now pressing for comprehensive legislation." 8
112.
113.
114.
115.

CAL. COMM'R CORPS BULL. No. 67-8 (July 14, 1967).
CAL. AD.CODE tit. 10, § 260.105.4 (1969).
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
Wis. AD. RULES § 1.02(2) (1970).

116. People v. Jet-A-Way Indus., Inc., Crim. No. 146,381 (San Mateo County,
Cal., Super. Ct., filed July 1969), in CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REV., Aug. 11, 1969, at
5; State v. Buffalo Franchises Corp. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed May 29, 1969); State v. Dutch
Inns of America, Inc. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Feb. 7, 1969).
117. E.g. Ganakas v. Continental Beverage Corp., Civil No. 134,180 (Fresno
County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed 1968); Lower v. Der Wienerschnitzel Int'l, Inc., Civil
No. 303,104 (San Diego County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed Feb. 27, 1968). Roy Rogers
Beverage Corp. v. Funkhauser, Civil No. 155,857 (Orange County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Sept. 15, 1967).
118. Pierno, Franchise Regulations, The Need for a New Approach, 44 Los
ANGELES B. BULL. 501, 535 (1969).
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1I. Proposed Legislation
Although franchisor abuses have taken many forms,119 three are
most prevelant, and most in need of regulation. First are those misrepresentations and half-truths used in selling the franchise; second is
the failure to deliver the business within a reasonable time after the
franchise has been purchased; and third are unreasonable termination
provisions.
A. Termination

The first abuse to receive legislative attention was unjust franchise
terminations. During the late 1950s, due in part to the collapse of
Packard, Hudson, Nash and Studebaker, and in part to a desire to weed
out small dealers, a great many auto dealer franchises were terminated.
As the standard franchise agreement allowed termination "at will" without cause, 120 the courts held that absent an attempt to enforce retail
pricing agreements' 21 or proof of a conspiracy to establish a monopoly,' 22 the mere termination of a dealership did not give rise to a cause
of action. 23
In 1955, the automobile dealers, through the Dealer Trade Association and the National Automobile Dealers Association,12 4 lobbied for
relief. After extensive hearings, 25 Congress passed the Automobile
119. See H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING 1-107 (1969); Elliott,
Chicken Delight?, Barron's, Sept. 29, 1969, at 5; Elliott, Home to Roost, Barron's,
Sept. 22, 1969; Elliott, Stickey Fingers?, Barron's, Sept. 15, 1969, at 3; Elliott, Speculative Bellyache?, Barron's, Aug. 25, 1969, at 3.
120. Freed, A Study of Dealers' Suits Under the Automobile Dealers' Franchise
Act, 41 U. DET. L. 245, 247-48 (1964).
121. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441
(1922).
122. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941).
123. Packard Motorcar Co. v. Webster Motorcar Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); Schwing v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md. 1956); Martin
v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Mich. 1950). For later cases see Scanlan v.
Anheuser Busch Corp., 388 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1968); Amplex of Maryland, Inc. v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036
(1968).
124. Freed, supra note 120, at 246 n.10.
125. See Hearings on Automobile Marketing Practices Before the Subcomm. on
Automobile Marketing Practices of the Senate Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957); Hearings on Automobile Dealer FranchisesBefore
Antitrust Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1956); Hearings on the Anti-Trust Laws Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. REP.
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Dealer Franchise Act in 1956.126
The Act allows the dealer to bring suit against a manufacturer in
the federal district court and recover damages and attorneys' fees if the
manufacturer did not "act in good faith . . . in terminating, canceling, or not renewing the franchise . . *.."',
The dealer has the burden
of showing a lack of "good faith,"' 12 8 a term equated by some courts with
"coercion" or "intimidation." 29 As a consequence, dealer suits have
been notably unsuccessful. 3 0
A bill was introduced into the New York legislature in 1969 to
No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); S. REP. No. 2073, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1956). For a description of the lobbying effect, see Kelley, Mutiny of the Car Deal-

ers, HARPERS, Aug. 1956, at 69.
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
Several states also enacted statutes regulating the manufacturer-dealer relationship. Brown & Conwell, Automobile Manufacturer-Dealer Legislation, 57 COLIrM. L. REv. 219 n.4 (1957). On balance, these statutes have not been successful and have been held unconstitutional in at least three
jurisdictions. General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956);
Rebsamen Motor Co. v. Phillips, 226 Ark. 146, 289 S.W.2d 170 (1956); Joyner v.
Centre Motor Co., 192 Va. 627, 66 S.E.2d 469 (1951). The Automobile Dealers Franchise Act has received extensive comment. See Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract
Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DuKE L.J. 465; Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchises and the Code-Mixing Classified and Coordinated Uncertainty with Conflict, 22 Bus. LAW. 1075 (1967); Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957); Macaulay, Changing
a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal With It:
Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and the Legal System, 1965 Wis. L. REv.
483, 740; Strand & French, The Automobile Dealers Franchise Act: Another Experiment in Federal Class Legislation, 25 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 667 (1957); 52 Nw. U.L.
REv. 253 (1957); 9 STAN. L. REv. 760 (1957).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964).
128. Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 317 F.2d 712, 718 (3d Cir. 1962), citing S. REP.
No.2073, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1956).
129. Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121, 128 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 887 (1962); Leach v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F. Supp. 349, 354 (N.D.
Cal. 1960); Pinney & Topliff v. Chrysler Corp., 176 F. Supp. 801, 809 (S.D. Cal. 1959);
H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956); 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4596 (1956).
"The term 'fair and equitable' as used in the bill is qualified by the
term 'so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats
of coercion or intimidation from the other party.' In each case arising under this
bill, good faith must be determined in the context of coercion or intimidation or
threats of coercion or intimidation." Id. at 4603.
130. Southern Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967); Miller Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 286 F. Supp. 529 (D. Mass. 1968); Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968); General Motors Corp. v. Mac Co., 247 F.
Supp. 723 (D. Colo. 1965); Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 204 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa.),
rev'd, 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962). But see American Motors Sales Corp. v. Semke,
384 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1967); Volkswagen Interamericana v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 919 (1966).
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obviate two of the defects of the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act.
Section 2 of the bill provided that "no manufacturer. . . shall terminate. . . or refuse to renew any contract. . . for the sale of new motor
vehicles . . . except for cause."'13 1 Section 3 entitled the dealer to a
preliminary injunction preventing termination of his franchise during
the pendency of the action.' 3 ' Although the bill was passed by the
legislature, it was vetoed by Governor Rockefeller. 8 3
Because of general dissatisfaction with the Automobile Dealer
34
Franchise Act, and because it did not extend to other industries,
bills have been introduced in each of the past several years 35 with hearings held by the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust in 1965,'31 and
again in 1967. 37 The Hart and Eastland Bills received considerable
attention. The Hart Bill 38 provided that a terminated franchisee could
sue for the recovery of damages, unless (a) the franchisor paid the
franchisee the reasonable market value of his building 3 9 and a "sum
equal to the value of the franchise, including good will"; 40 or (b)
proved "that the franchise was terminated or the customer preempted
by reason of the conscious malfeasance or willful failure of the franchisee to perform adequately, competently and in good faith the lawful
The Eastland
duties imposed upon him by the franchise contract."''
Bill, although employing different terminology, was basically the
same. 42 Hearings were held, 43 resulting in a redrafting of the Hart
Bill, which was introduced on April 25, 1969. 44
New York S.B. 4915, § 2 (1969).
Id. § 3.
CONTIENTAL FRANCHISE REv., July 28, 1969, at 7.
134. H. BROWN, FRANCiusNG: TRAP FOR THE TRUsTiNG 80 (1969), suggests that
the only "logical explanation for such restricted application lies in the failure of other
types of franchisees to make their voices heard at the time the statute was passed."
135. See H.R. 13628, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 12490, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969); S. 1967, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 2818, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967); S. 2507, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2321, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
H.R. 11972, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 10113, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
136. Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
& Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., pts. 2-4
(1965).
137. Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
& Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6 (1967).
138. S. 2321, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
139. Id. § 3(a).
140. Id. § 3(c).
141. Id. § 6.
142. S. 2507, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
143. Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
& Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
144. S. 1967, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
131.
132.
133.
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The guts of the amended Hart Bill provided that it shall be a violation of the Act for any franchisor to terminate, cancel, or fail to renew
a franchise unless the franchisor can prove that the cancellation was for
good cause. 4 ' The bill departs from the philosophy of the Automobile
Dealer Franchise Act 46 in two major respects. First, the burden of
proof has been shifted to the franchisor. The dealer no longer needs
to prove that the manufacturer failed "to act in good faith." Literally
interpreted, the franchisee has established a prima facie case when he
shows that his franchise was terminated. The manufacturer must then
show that termination was for cause. The result should be that a great
many cases that would have been disposed of by summary judgment
now will go to the jury.
Second, the standard of behavior has been tightened. "Good
cause" includes the failure by the franchisee to substantially comply
with those requirements imposed upon him by the franchise agreement
if the requirements are both essential and reasonable, or his use of bad
faith in carrying out the terms of the contract. It will be recalled that
"bad faith" under the Automobile Dealer Act was tantamount to "coercion or intimidation."' 4 7 There is no doubt that plaintiffs will fare better under the Hart Bill than under the Automobile Dealers Act. However, the bill, as it is presently drafted, has been opposed by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Bureau of the
Budget, 148 and for this reason probably will not be enacted in its present form.
Section 3 provides, in part, that no franchisor may "terminate,
cancel, or fail to renew a franchise for any reason without having first
given written notice of such termination, cancellation, or intent not to
145.

Id. § 4 provides in its entirety:

"Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or

conditions of any franchise, and except as provided in section 5, it shall be a violation

of this Act for any franchisor engaged in commerce, directly or through any officer,
agent, or employee to terminate, cancel, or fail to renew a franchise except that it
shall be a complete defense under this Act for the franchisor to prove that the cancellation was for good cause. For the purposes of this Act, good cause for terminating, canceling, or failing to renew a franchise shall be-(a) failure by the franchisee
to substantially comply with those requirements imposed upon him by the franchise

which requirements are both essential and reasonable; or (b) use of bad faith by the
franchisee in carrying out the terms of the franchise."
146. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-22 (1964).
147.

Id. § 1221(e).

148.

Letter from Richard G. Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General, to Senator

James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, June 26, 1969;

Letter from Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, to Senator
James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Oct. 6,
1969, at 6.
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renew to the franchisee at least ninety days in advance of such termi."149 This provision was criticized by both the Antitrust
nation ...
Division'5 ° and the FTC'' as unworkable. A 90 day notice provision
helps neither the franchisee nor the franchisor. The former does not
have time to bring his case to trial, while the latter is prevented from
terminating a franchisee who is completely irresponsible or perhaps
filing for bankruptcy until irreparable damage has been done. A more
workable suggestion would be a mandatory 20 day notice period (sufficient to obtain an injunction to prevent termination until the issue was
resolved at trial) coupled with a workable injunction provision.
Both the Eastland and original Hart Bills contained provisions
1 52
allowing the court to enjoin termination while the suit is in process;
these provisions have been deleted from the present bill. Under existing
law, however, the federal courts will enjoin termination if a showing
can be made that there is a substantial likelihood that the franchisee
will prevail at trial. 15 '
It is possible, of course, that the more liberal standards of the
present bill will result in an injunction being granted when merited
under such standards. However, in many instances, the franchisee,
acting without the aid of discovery, cannot make such a showing when
the suit is first instigated. The New York legislature felt so strongly
that a franchisee should be allowed to retain his franchise, and the
wherewithal to fight the franchisor, that a mandatory injunction proThis may be going too far. A
vision was included in its bill.'5
workable solution, however, would be a provision requiring the granting
149. S. 1967, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1969).
150. The Antitrust Division has taken the position that the bill will discourage
distribution through company-owned outlets, thereby promoting forward integration.
This conclusion is somewhat problematic. It certainly would not apply to fast food
franchisors who utilize the franchise system because they do not have sufficient
funds to operate their own outlets. See Letter from Richard G. Kleindienst, Deputy
Attorney General, to Senator James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, June 26, 1969, at 3.

151. Letter from Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,
to Senator James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Oct. 6, 1969.
152. S. 2507, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1967); S. 2321, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 7 (1967).
72,964
153. Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 5 TRADE REQ. REP.
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1969); Swartz v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 297 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J.

1969); cf. Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1969);
Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962); Madsen v. Chrysler Corp.,
261 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1966).

154. New York S.B. 4915, § 3 (1969).
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of an injunction in all suits except those where it appeared that there
was a substantial possibility that the franchisee would not prevail at
trial. This provision would be in keeping with the philosophy of the
New York bill.
The second major problem is the so-called FTC clause, section 6,
which states:
It shall be a violation of this Act for any franchisor engaged in
commerce, directly or through any officer, agent, or employee to
engage directly or indirectly in methods of competition with any
franchisee that constitute unfair methods of competition within the
meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 155
Section 6 is extremely vague. Is it meant to allow franchisees a
remedy, not shared by other plaintiffs, to recover damages for any action
constituting a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act,' 56 or does it merely protect the franchisee from unfair competition
by "company stores"?' 5 7 In either case, section 6 has no place in a
termination bill, unless it is the intention of Congress to enact a comprehensive franchise regulatory statute.
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the scope of the bill
is uncertain. As presently drafted, it deals primarily with terminations and attempts secondarily to protect franchisees from "unfair
methods of competition" by franchisors. The Senate Subcommittee
heard extensive testimony concerning a wide variety of abuses.' 58 Consequently, it would seem appropriate that the entire franchising industry
should be examined with the aim of drafting a statute providing for full
franchise protection.
B.

Franchisor Misrepresentation

A problem even more in need of a remedy than unjust termination
is the frequent misrepresentations or half-truths disseminated by the
franchisor in an attempt to sell franchise units. Many franchisors receive a substantial portion of their gross income from the sale of
franchises. This is especially true with the newer small operations.
Although the data is sketchy, there is considerable indication that the
bulk of the initial franchise fee is pure profit. Consequently, there is
155. S. 1967, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1969).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
157. Several franchisors have repurchased franchise outlets and are now competing with their franchisees. See note 13 supra.
158. 115 CONG. REC. S4136 (daily ed. April 25, 1969); see 113 CONG. REC. 23,376

(1967).
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an incentive to tell the prospective franchisee almost anything to make
the sale.
Table I gives an indication of the magnitude of initial franchise
fees received by franchisors filing recent public offerings compared
with gross revenues and net earnings. Table II, taken from prospectuses where franchise costs were separated, compares the profit received
from initial franchise fees with net income from all sources, including
franchise fees.

Name
Der Wienerschnitzel
Fill-R-Up
Food Host
Fotomat
Franchise Management
Systems
Hardee's
Kentucky Fried Chicken
Love's
Lum's
Management Recruiters
Mickey Mantle
Minnie Pearl's
Mr. Quick
National Pizza
Pizza Hut
Quality Courts
Royal Inns
Senor Taco
Taco Bell
Welcome Aboard

TABLE -159
Gross
Total
Franchise Fees
Revenues
$1,195,275
$ 4,604,229
200,000
771,551
370,000
11,336,206
13,329,591
8,157,500
214,728
181,500
501,440
755,000
4,191,718
195,660
147,000
2,490,000
30,000
2,420,155
86,403
266,679
1,174,540
935,400
1,914,333
420,842

1,528,279
25,884,849
80,196,536
1,687,982
60,297,194
2,300,189
201,194
2,724,151
799,074
3,151,828
4,485,975
16,686,442
1,895,106
1,098,880
5,997,318
435,442

Net Profit
Before Tax
$ 230,962
104,614
1,355,737
4,042,310
700,365
1,682,997
14,988,124
764,138
2,970,984
254,294
30,627
2,135,640
18,734
435,798
1,246,571
1,837,916
1,436,825
664,490
1,065,397
37,040

159.
Preliminary Prospectus for Der Wienerschnitzel Int'l, Inc., at '6 (Feb.
24, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus for Fill-R-Up Systems, Inc., at 7 (Sept. 10, 1969);
Prospectus for Food Host U.S.A., Inc. at 5 (Sept. 4, 1969); Prospectus for Fotomat
Corp., at 5 (April 30, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus for Franchise Management
Systems, Inc., at 4 (Sept. 16, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus for Hardee's Food Systems,
Inc., at 4 (Oct. 16, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus for Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., at
6 (April 23, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus for Love's, Inc., at 10 (Sept. 18, 1969);
Prospectus for Lum's, Inc., at 8 (Sept. 24, 1969); Prospectus for Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., at 5, 6 (Feb. 12, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus for Mickey Mantle Men's Shops, Inc., at 5 (July 31, 1969); Prospectus for Minnie Pearl's Chicken
System, Inc., at 6 (May 1, 1968); Preliminary Prospectus for Mr. Quick, Inc., at 5
(Sept. 11, 1969); Prospectus for National Pizza, at 5 (June 26, 1969); Prospectus for
Pizza Hut, Inc., at 5 (Jan. 30, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus for Quality Courts Motels, Inc., at 5 (Nov. 17, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus for Royal Inns of America,
Inc., at 5, 6 (Nov. 21, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus for Senor Taco, Inc., at 6
(Sept. 29, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus for Taco Bell, at 5 (May 26, 1969);
Prospectus for Welcome Aboard Vacation Centers, Inc., at 6 (Nov. 24, 1969).
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TABLE II
Gross
Expenses
Net
Net
Franchise Allocable To
Franchise
Name
Fees
Franchise Sales*
Fees
Earnings-?
Lum's
$4,191,717
$3,227,399
$ 964,319
$2,970,984
Mickey Mantle
147,000
127,170
30,961
30,627
Minnie Pearl's
2,490,000
48,123
2,441,877
2,135,640
Mr. Quick
30,000
17,000
13,000
18,734
National Pizza
2,420,155
752,896
1,667,259
435,798
Quality Courts
266,679
202,773
63,906
1,837,916
Royal Inns
1,174,540
126,100
1,048,440
1,436,825
Welcome Aboard
420,842
398,401
22,441
37,040
* Estimated where not specifically allocated in income statement.
t Net Profit Before Provisions for Income Taxes.
The allegations found in two recent complaints illustrate both
160
gross and subtle misrepresentations. In Meal or Snack Systems, Inc.
the complaint alleges, among other things, that contrary to respondents'
representations: 1. A complete ready-to-operate Jolly Giant Hamburger
Pizza Drive-In restaurant cannot be purchased for $8,500 or $9,500,
but such franchises cost substantially more; 2. Jolly Giant franchisees
investing $9,500 do not earn $30,000 a year but substantially less, and
do not earn three times their original investment; 3. Franchisees do not
have a minimum sales volume of $100,000 but generally less.
Since the respondent allowed an order to cease and desist from
making such representations to be entered against it, it may be presumed that some if not all of the allegations were true. 16'
In Lower v. Der Wienerschnitzel International,Inc., 62 the plaintiff
alleged in his first amended complaint that a brochure delivered to him
contained representations that
the "average franchise gets his money back after just 12 months
of operation; that the average franchise location earns from 20%
to 25% net profit"; that Der Wienerschnitzel has never had a
failure . . . in any location; that "all franchisees are making
money" that "average stand
nets . . .$2,000.00 a month against
'
gross sales of $9,000.00. 163

On information and belief, the plaintiff alleged that each of these rep64
resentations was untrue.1
These suits are not isolated examples. A great many actions
160.
161.
162.

3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,671, at 21,038 (FTC Apr. 1, 1969).
Id. at 21,039.
Civil No. 303,104 (San Diego County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed Feb. 27, 1968).

163.

First Amended Complaint at 3, Lower v. Der Wienerschnitzel Int'l, Inc., Civil

No. 30,3104 (San Diego County, Cal., Super Ct., filed Feb. 27, 1968).

164.

Id. at 6.
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based on common law. 5 or criminal fraud' 66 have been brought against
franchisors in the past two years. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission has instigated a series of actions for misrepresentation' under
section 5 of the FTC Act.' 68
Unfortunately, these are after the fact remedies. The investor
has already parted with his franchise fee and in most instances, has
suffered additional losses. If he recovers, it will only be after lengthy
litigation; in many instances, the franchisor may be bankrupt, prohibiting any recovery.' 69
C. Failure to Deliver the Franchise
A frequent complaint is that franchises are sold, the fees are collected, but then the franchisor fails to deliver the promised franchise
within a reasonable period, if at all. This was one of Lower's complaints in his suit against Der Wienerschnitzel. Lower alleged that he
165. Ridnour v. International Sales Co., Civ. A. No. 5716-69-P (S.D. Ala., filed
Nov. 1969), in CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REV., Dec. 1, 1969, at 6; March v. International Sales Co., Civ. A. No. 5645-69-P (S.D. Ala., filed Nov. 1969), in CONTINENTAL
FRANCHISE REV., Dec. 1, 1969, at 6; Waddleton v. Credit Clearing Corp., Civ. No. 69986-1 (D. Mass., filed Sept. 1969), in CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REV., Oct. 20, 1969, at
8; Klinzing v. Shakey's, Inc., No. 69-C-344 (E.D. Wis., filed July 14, 1969), in CoNTmENTAL FRANCHISE REv., July 28, 1969, at 2; Davies v. Missouri B & B Permanent
& Temporary Placement Systems, Inc., Civ. A. No. 17264-1 (W.D. Mo., filed June
1969), in CONTINENTAL FRANCiSE REv., July 14, 1969, at 5; Holzmark v. Seltz, No.
68 Civ. 3421 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 26, 1968), in CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REV., Apr. 7,
1969, at 5; Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Incr, 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Kiah
v. The Cookery Corp., Civil No. 164,092 (Orange County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed
Dec. 16, 1968); Lower v. Der Wienerschnitzel Int'l, Inc., Civil No. 303,104 (San
Diego County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed Feb. 27, 1968); Roy Rogers Beverage Corp. v.
Funkhauser, Civil No. 155,857 (Orange County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed Sept. 15,
1967); Bishop v. National Outdoor Display, Inc. (Ford County, Kan., Dist. Ct., filed
Jan. 1969), in CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REv., Oct. 6, 1969, at 6; 31 July Corp. v.
Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp., Civ. No. 8006-69 (N.Y. Sup. CL, filed June 1969), in
CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REV., Oct. 6, 1969, at 6.
166. United States v. Bessesen, No. 4-68 Cr. 98 (D. Minn. July 1969), in CoNTINENTAL FRANCHISE REv., Aug. 11, 1969, at 7; People v. Jet-A-Way Indus., Inc., Crim.
No. 146,381 (San Mateo County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 1969), in CONTINENTAL
FRANCHISE REv., Aug. 11, 1969, at 5.
167. Thermochemical Prods., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
18,622 (FTC July 25,
1969); Meal or Snack System, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,671 (FTC Apr. 1, 1969);
Youngstown Spectrum Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 18,648 (FTC Mar. 24, 1969);
Gemini Enterprises, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 18,552 (FTC 1968); Excel Chem.
Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 18,476 (FTC 1968); Mercury Elec., Inc., 3 TRADE REo.
REP. 18,404 (FTC 1968).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
169. See Kiah v. The Cookery Corp., Civil No. 164,092 (Orange County, Cal.,
Super. Ct., filed Dec. 16, 1968).
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purchased three franchises on October 24, 1966, and as of the date his
suit was filed, February 27, 1968, only one had been delivered.1 7
This failure is not unique with Der Wienerschnitzel. In a recent
prospectus, National Pizza disclosed that it had franchised over 700 distributorships, 215 of which were not in operation; 171 Royal Inns revealed that it sold 33 licenses of which 11 were operating and 8 were
under construction; 172 Fill-R-Up had granted 54 franchises only 8 of
which were in operation; 173 and Senor Taco had sold 96 franchises, 19
of which were operating and 11 more were under construction. 1 4
D. Recommendations
The obvious solution is federal regulation, preferably along two
lines. First, each franchisor offering a franchise in interstate commerce
should register the offering with the Securities and Exchange Commission. As previously discussed there is no doubt the SEC has authority
to classify a franchise offering as a security, thereby requiring the filing
of a registration statement and the distribution of a prospectus to each
potential purchaser.
If the SEC takes jurisdiction over franchise offerings, Congress
would have justification to prohibit the states, under the preemption
doctrine, from regulating franchise offerings, thereby eliminating
"blue sky" problems. The alternative to SEC registration is a series of
state statutes.
Unfortunately, the SEC has given no indication that registration
of franchise offerings will be required; the Halpern Bill,' 7 5 the only
170. First Amended Complaint at 4-5, Lower v. Der Wienerschnitzel Int'l, Inc.,
Civil No. 303,104 (San Diego County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed Feb. 27, 1968); see Preliminary Prospectus for Der Wienerschnitzel Int'l, Inc. (Feb. 24, 1969), wherein it was
stated: "As of January 15, 1969, no store locations had been opened, but franchises for
various areas in the States of Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada and Hawaii had
been sold. Approximately $250,000 of gross sales were derived by Company during
the three months ended November 30, 1968 from the sale of Friar Fish's franchises."
Id. at 13.
171. Prospectus for National Pizza Corp., at 2 (June 26, 1969).
172. Preliminary Prospectus for Royal Inns of America, Inc., at 6 (Nov. 21,
1969).
173. Preliminary Prospectus for Fill-R-Up Systems, Inc., at 3 (Sept. 10, 1969).
174. Preliminary Prospectus for Senor Taco, Inc., at 3 (Sept. 29, 1969).
175. H.R. 13628, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The Senate Small Business Committee's Urban and Rural Economic Development Subcommittee scheduled three days of
hearings in January of 1970 on franchising. Subsequent reports indicate that Senator
Harrison Williams of New Jersey will introduce a registration-disclosure bill later this
year.
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pending nontermination bill, 176 (merely imposing a requirement of fair
dealing and a prohibition against the franchisor competing with the franchisee) ,' is so poorly drafted that it has received little attention. At

this writing, it is safe to say that national regulation, if it comes at all, is
years away. The states, however, are taking action. Massachusetts and
and bills have been introduced
New York 78 are studying the problem,
80
in Minnesota 79 and California.
The Minnesota bill18 1 would require the franchisor to file an application accompanied by a copy of all sales material, an executed copy of
the franchise agreement, and a $5,000 performance bond. The franchise agreement would be required to spell out the entire franchisorfranchisee relationship, with special provision being made for a description of the franchise territory and the termination provisions. The
Commissioner of Corporations would conduct an investigation and if
he found that all representations were true and that the franchisor was
the application would
capable of performing all obligations set 8forth,
3
be granted. 8 2 The bill died in committee.'
On November 13, 1969, California State Senator Clark L. Bradley held hearings to determine if there was need for franchise regulation. Several persons representing franchisees spoke of abuses and
suggested regulation concerning four subjects: escrowing franchise
fees, tie-in sales, full disclosure, and termination clauses. At the con84
clusion of the hearings, the Attorney General and the Commissioner'
of Corporations were asked to jointly draft a model bill. On January 2,
1960, the first draft of a franchise bill, prepared by Commissioner of
Corporations Anthony Piemo and Attorney General Thomas Lynch,
was distributed. Comment was requested by January 20, 1970. Subsequently, the bill was redrafted twice and introduced in the State
Senate on March 18, 1970.85
176. Id. § 3(a).
177. Id. § 3(a), (c).
178. Massachusetts S. 435 (1969). The New York Attorney General's office
has sent out more than 1,000 questionnaire forms to franchisors requesting information
on the entire operation, including financial data, the financial demands made of the
franchisee and a copy of the franchise agreement. CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE RnV.,
Dec. 15, 1969, at 1.
179. See notes 181-83 & accompanying text infra.
180. CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REv., Jan. 26, 1970, at 2; see text accompanying
notes 184-97 infra.
181. H.R. No. 465 (1969).
182. See CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE R v., Mar. 24, 1969, at 6.
183. See id., July 28, 1969, at 7.
184. Id., Nov. 13, 1969, at 5.
185. S.B. 647 (1970).
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Summary and Analysis of the Pierno Bill

The Pierno Bill would add to the Corporations Code a new division beginning with section 31000.186 Simply stated, it will require
registration of all franchises operated in California or offered to California residents after January 1, 1971.187 The registration form is similar to that filed on Form S-1 with the SEC, under the 1933 Act.'

The similarity continues in that each proposed franchisee must receive a
prospectus containing most of the material in the registration form 48
hours before he purchases a franchise.18 However, in contrast to federal regulation, the Commissioner has the power to require the escrow
of franchise fees,' 90 and to issue a stop order if the franchisor has "failed
to demonstrate that adequate financial arrangements have been made to
fulfill obligations to provide real estate, improvements, equipment,
inventory, training or other items included in the offering.'
In the
original draft, franchisors with a net worth of over $20 million, who
have conducted business for the past six years, were exempt from registration; 1 9 2 however, this provision was deleted in the second draft.

They key section of the Bill is section 31111,193 which is divided
186. The Pierno Bill proposes to add sections 31000 through 31516 to the California
Corporations Code and amend sections 25019 and 25212 of that Code. [The Pierno
Bill is hereinafter cited as Proposed Bill].
187. Proposed Bill §§ 31013(a)-(b), 31110.
188. Compare Proposed Bill § 31111 with Form S-i, 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
8120-8270 (1969).
189. Compare Proposed Bill § 31119 with 15 U.S.C. § 773(b)(2) (1964). Only
a person named in the registration, a real estate salesman, or a securities broker-dealer
may offer a franchise.
190. Proposed Bill § 31113 states in its entirety: "The commissioner may by rule or
order require the escrow or impound of franchise fees or other funds paid by the
franchisee or subfranchisor prior to the opening of the franchise business, or at the
option of the franchisor, the furnishing of surety bond as provided by rule of the
commissioner, if he finds that such requirement is necessary and appropriate to protect prospective franchisees or subfranchisors."
191. Id. § 31115(c).
192. Original draft § 31100. This provision was designed to exempt all qualifynig
companies from the act; however, because of widespread criticism, it was deleted. As
section 31101 allows the Commissioner by rule to exempt any transaction not comprehended by the act, it would not be unreasonable for the Commissioner to exempt those
firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (due to its detailed reporting requirements). This would encompass all oil companies and most of the major franchisors.
193. Proposed Bill § 31111 states in its entirety: "The application for registration
of an offer shall be filed with the commissioner and shall contain the following:
"(a) The name of the franchisor, the name under which the franchisor is doing
or intends to do business, and the name of any parent or affiliated company that will
engage in business transactions with franchisees.
"(b) The franchisor's principal business address and the name and address of its
agent in the State of California authorized to receive process.
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into 19 subsections, specifying the information that must be contained in

the registration statement. The first three of these subsections merely
"(c) The business form of the franchisor, whether corporate, partnership, or
otherwise.
"(d) Such information concerning the identity and business experience of persons
affiliated with the franchisor, as the commissioner may by rule prescribe.
"(e) A statement whether any person identified in the application for registration:
"(1) Has been convicted of a felony, or plead nolo contendere to a felony
charge, or held liable in a civil action by final judgment if such felony or civil action
involved fraud, embezzlement, fradulent conversion or misappropriation of property; or
"(2) Is subject to any currently effective order of the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the securities administrator of any state denying registration to or revoking or suspending the registration of such person as a securities broker or dealer or
investment advisor or is subject to any currently effective order of any national securities
association or national securities exchange (as defined in the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934) suspending or expelling such person from membership in such association
or exchange; or
"(3) Is subject to any currently effective order or ruling of the Federal Trade
Commission; or
"(4) Is subject to any currently effective injunctive or restrictive order relating
to business activity as a result of an action brought by any public agency or department,
including, without limitation, actions affecting a license as a real estate broker or salesman.
"Such statement shall set forth the court, date of conviction or judgment, any
penalty imposed or damages assessed, or the date, nature and issuer of such order.
"(f) The length of time the franchisor: (1) has conducted a business of the type
to be operated by the franchisees, (2) has granted francHises for such business, and
(3) has granted franchises in other lines of business.
"(g) A recent financial statement of the franchisor, together with a statement of
any material changes in the financial condition of the franchisor from the date thereof.
The commissioner may by rule or order prescribe (1) the form and content of financial
statements required under this law, (2) the circumstances under which consolidated
financial state-ments shall be filed, and (3) the circumstances under which financial
statements shall be audited by independent certified public accountants or public accountants.
"(h) A copy of the franchise contract or agreement proposed for use in this
state.
"(i) A statement of the franchise fee charged, the proposed application of the
proceeds of such fee by the franchisor and the formula by which the amount of the
fee is determined if the fee is not the same in all cases.
"(j) A statement describing any payments or fees other than franchise fees that
the franchisee or subfranchisor is required to pay to the franchisor, including royalties
and payments or fees which the franchisor collects in whole or in part on behalf of a
third party or parties.
"(k) A statement of the conditions under which the franchise agreement may be
terminated or renewal refused, or repurchased at the option of the franchisor.
"(1) A statement as to whether, by the terms of the franchise agreement or by
other device or practice, the franchisee or subfranchisor is required to purchase from the
franchisor or his designee services, supplies, products, fixtures or other goods relating
to the establishment or operation of the franchise business, together with a description
thereof.
"(m) A statement as to whether, by the terms of the franchise agreement or other
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require the name, address and business form under which the franchisor
operates.
Subsection d gives the Commissioner authority to issue regulations
requiring such information concerning the identity and business experience of the persons affiliated with the franchisor as deemed necessary.
Subsection e (2) requires a statement whether the franchisor or any
person identified in the registration form has been convicted of a felony
or suffered a judgment for fraud, embezzlement, or misappropriation of
property; or is subject to an order or injunction by a regulatory agency.
Subsection f requires a statement as to the length of time the
franchisor has conducted the franchised business and the length of time
the franchisor has granted franchises for this business or other businesses.
Subsections g and h require attachments of a financial statement
of the franchisor and a copy of a typical franchise agreement.
Subsections i and j deal with franchise fees. Subsection i requires a statement of the fee to be charged, the proposed application of
the fee, and the formula by which the fee is determined if it is not the
same in all cases. Subsection j calls for a statement describing any
device or practice, the franchisee is limited in the goods or services offered by him to his
customers.
"(n) A statement of the terms and conditions of any financing arrangements
when offered directly or indirectly by the franchisor or his agent or affiliate.
"(o) A statement of any past or present practice or of any intent of the franchisor
to sell, assign or discount to a third party any note, contract or other obligation of the
franchisee or subfranchisor in whole or in part.
"(p) A copy of any statement of estimated or projected franchisee earnings
prepared for presentation to prospective franchisees or subfranchisors, or other persons,
together with a statement setting forth the data upon which such estimation or projection
is based.
"(q) A statement of earnings of past and present franchisees, as required by rule
of the commissioner.
"(r) A statement of any compensation or other benefit given or promised to a
public figure arising, in whole or in part, from (1) the use of the public figure in the
name or symbol of the franchise or (2) the endorsement or recommendation of the
franchise by the public figure in advertisements.
"(s) A statement of the number of franchises presently operating and proposed
to be sold, as may be required by rule of the commissioner.
"(t) A statement as to whether franchisees or subfranchisors receive an exclusive
area or territory.
"(u) Other information as the commissioner may require.
"(v) Other information as the franchisor may desire to present.
"(w) When the person filing the application for registration is a subfranchisor, the
application shall also include the same information concerning the subfranchisor as is
required from the franchisor pursuant to this section."
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payments or fees (including royalties), other than franchise fees, paid
to the franchisor or a third party.
Subsection k demands a statement of the conditions under which
the franchise agreement may be terminated or renewal refused.
Subsection I requires disclosure of any goods or services required
to be purchased from the franchisor or his designee.
Subsection m requires a statement of any limitation imposed on
the goods or services which may be offered by the franchisee.
Subsections n and o deal with financing the purchase of the
franchise. Subsection n requires full disclosure of the terms of the
contract. Subsection o requires a statement whether the franchisor
intends to sell or assign the franchisee's "paper."
Subsection p requires the filing of a copy of any statement of
estimated or projected franchisee revenues prepared for presentation to
prospective franchisees, together with a statement setting forth the dates
upon which such estimation or projection is based.
Subsection q requires a statement of earnings of past and present
franchisees if required by the Commissioner.
Subsection r, added on the second or third draft, requires a statement of any compensation given a public figure for the use of his name.
Subsections s and t, also added after the first draft, require disclosure of the number of franchises presently operating and proposed to
be sold, and whether the franchisee receives an exclusive area.
Sections u, v, and w are catchalls, providing for such additional
information as required by the Commissioner or desired to be filed by
the franchisor.
The bill, as proposed, provides for "full disclosure" with limited
regulation in three areas by the Commissioner.1 4 The first is that the
Commissioner may issue a stop order if the franchisor has "failed to
demonstrate that adequate financial arrangements have been made to
fulfill obligations to provide real estate, improvements, equipment,
inventory, training or other items included in the offering."' 9 5 The
second is that the Commissioner may issue a stop order if any person
identified in the registration statement has been convicted of a criminal
offense, or has had an order or civil judgment of the type described in
Section 3 1111 (e) entered against him, if "the involvement of such person in the sale or management of the franchise creates an unreasonable
194. Of course, the Commissioner may impose detailed specific requirements by
regulation once he has sufficient operating experience to delineate the problem areas.
195. Proposed Bill § 31115(c).
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risk to prospective franchisee or franchisees."' 6 The third is that the
Commissioner may require "the escrow or impound of franchise fees if
he finds that such requirement is necessary and appropriate to protect
prospective franchisees. "197
It is clear that registration is needed and that the Pierno Bill, by
and large, is a comprehensive, well-thought-out bill. However, further
revision is needed in two areas.
First, there is no reason why the Commissioner should depart
from a "full disclosure" approach. Disclosure of what will be done
with franchisee funds is adequate, and the Commissioner need not impose escrow conditions. If he is given this authority it is too easy for
the practice to become established as the "safe" practice that all funds
will be escrowed and only released when the franchised business is delivered. Although the regulations do not specifically so provide, this
is done with condominiums.' 1 However, in condominium construction, the buyer makes only a nominal deposit at the time he purchases
his unit, and arranges for his permanent financing to become available
when the project is complete. In contrast, franchisors have been able
to extract all, or substantially all, of the franchise fee at the time the
agreement is signed. In many instances, the franchisor may need a
portion of the proceeds to equip the business for the franchisee. Therefore, if regulation is to be imposed, the escrowed funds should be released on a voucher system, allowing an initial payment when the
lease is signed, a second payment when the fixtures are installed, and a
final payment upon completion. The same reasoning applies to the
Commissioner's determination of whether the franchisor has made adequate financial arrangements to provide the items he offers. Furthermore, the Commissioner must then make subjective determinations
over subjects with which he may be totally unfamiliar.
The second area that should be reconsidered is section 3 1111. In
our opinion, this section is inadequate; although subsection e(2) requires disclosure of any effective orders of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Federal Trade Commission, and other regulatory bodies,
it makes no provision for disclosure of pending litigation. The practice
followed by the SEC of requiring full disclosure of all suits materially
affecting the franchisor's business should be adopted. To make this
provision more meaningful, suits which are either material to the fran196.

Id.§ 31115(d).

197.

Id. § 31113.

198.

See CAL. AD.

CODE

tit. 10, § 2792.6(2) (1965).
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chise operation, or are brought by a franchisee against the franchisor
or subfranchisor, should be disclosed.
Subsection f requires a statement of the length of time the
franchisor has conducted a business of the type to be operated by the
franchisee, the length of time it has granted franchises for said business,
and the length of time it has granted franchises in other lines of business. The latter disclosure is not material to the registration. However, the number of franchise units in operation during each of the past
five years, the gross sales of each unit, the number of units which are
currently in default on their franchise fees, and the number of units
which have been closed, is extremely meaningful to any prospective
franchisee. Subsection f should be amended to require this additional
information.
Subsections i and j require a statement describing fees other
than franchise fees, and the proposed application of the proceeds of
such fees. These subsections would be improved if the franchisor
were required to describe in detail his advertising program. In many
instances a percentage of the gross sales is collected for "advertising"
which then may never be expended for this item, may be used to purchase goods that would normally be deemed part of the franchise
package (printed sandwich bags, printed menus, match books, etc.),
or may be spent in a marketing area which in no way benefits the franchisee.
Subsection 1 requires a statement of the conditions under which
the franchise agreement may be terminated or renewal refused. This
provision was extended in the second draft to cover "buy back" provisions, under which the franchisor has the right to repurchase the franchise unit for a given price or a multiple of earnings; 199 it should also
include a description of any arbitration agreements. In addition, disclosure of the conditions upon which the franchise may be transferred
from one franchisee to another should be required.
In lieu of the escrow provision in section 31113, an additional
specification should be added wherein the franchisor is required to
represent whether the franchise fee will be escrowed prior to delivery
of the franchise unit, how it will be dispensed, and when the franchise
fee will be returned if the unit is not delivered. 00 This latter requirement will alleviate the problem of franchisor's selling franchises, collect199. E.g., Prospectus for Fotomat Corp., at 12 (Apr. 30, 1969).
200. See CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 2792.6(7) (1965), for the procedure dealing
with condominiums.
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ing the money, and then failing to deliver the promised unit for up to
20 1
two years.
Conclusion
Federal legislation or SEC regulation would be preferable to piecemeal state legislation; however, it does not appear to be forthcoming in
the near future. The Pierno Bill, especially if broadened somewhat,
will be a step in the right direction, and if similar statutes are adopted
by a number of states, the more flagrant abuses will be corrected.
201. This was one of Lower's complaints against Der Wienerschnitzel.
accompanying notes 170-74 supra.
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